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Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Professor Pitofsky. 
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT PITOFSKY, GEORGETOWN 
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 
Mr. PITOFSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Conyers. It is al-
ways a pleasure for me to appear before the Members of this Com-
mittee. 
I would like to talk a lit bit about the antitrust problems, and 
then address some of the purporteci.justifications for this deal. I 
will try to be brief about the problems, because I think Members 
~ of the Committee get it. 
" ," 
.!~ 
~J.' 
*~ " 
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Let's divide the country: up by those portions served by cable and 
those that are not. The ChlUl'Dlan mentioned that 30 percent of the 
people in Wisconsin don't have access to cable. That is not unusual; 
30 to 50 percent of people in 20 different States don't have access 
to cable. 
For those people, a merger of these two satellite companies is a 
virtual merger to monopoly, with high entry barriers, 80 no one 
else is going to come in to alleviate that condition. 
Let's look at the rest of the country. It is true that the satellite 
companies will compete with cable companies. But do they also 
compete more directly and more fully with each other so as to jus· 
tify their being in a separate market, so there, too, it is a merger 
to monopoly? And it seems to me that that could easily be the case. 
The analogy, I would suggest, is between railroads and airlines. 
Railroads and airlines compete, for example, New York to Wash· 
ington, Washington to New York, but that doesn't mean you let all 
of the airlines merge to monopoly. Because of their special prices, 
qualities, appeal to consumers, they are a separate market. 
And, incidentally, that is not an argument that only I ascribe to. 
Mr. Ergen said many think that ther are in a separate market. 
Well, that includes EchoStar, which Just a year ago in a private 
case against DirecTV argued that EchoStar and DirecTV cOnstrain 
each other's prices and cable is not an effective constraint of prices 
in that market. . 
Finally, even if I am wrong about all of this, it is still a three· 
to·two merger, and the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia just a year ago when Beechnut and Heinz tried to merge in cir· 
-cumstances very similar to this, a larger number one, two and 
three said, we need the merger to compete, there were high entry 
barriers; and the court said, we have looked back and we can't ~m.d 
a single case in history-I think they meant 110 years-in which 
a merger of this type was allowed. 
Those are the problems. 
What are the justifications? First, is the trade·off argument. Yes, 
the people in rural America will sacrifice some competition, but it 
is worth it because it will improve competition in the rest of the 
country. My answer to that argument is simple. We don't do it that 
way. 
The antitrust laws say, merl£ers that lessen competition in any 
market are illegal. And we don t trade off procompetitive effects in 
one market against _anticompetitive effects in another. The Su-
preme Court could not have been clearer about this in Philadelphia 
National Bank and since. 
Second, Mr. Ergen states, and I'm prepared to accept his claim, 
that there are real efficiencies to this deal. Well, first of all, there 
is a bipartisan consensus that efficiencies are easy to allege and 
hard to prove; and therefore you would want to look very carefully 
at the efficiency claims. . 
But let's assume that the efficiencies are there, and certaiI!ly 
some of them are there. But then the question is whether em· 
ciencies justify. a merger to monopoly or Ilear monopoly. I have 
been one who has been more welcoming of efficiency defenses than 
almost anyone in our community; but I have always said, it doesn't 
33 
justify mergers to monopoly. The DOJ-FrC guidelines say it doesn't justify mergers to monopoly. 
What is the point of achieving all of those efficiencies if you are 
a monopoly? Where is the incentive then to pass the efficiencies on 
to consumers without a competitive market? 
Finally and most interestmgly, EchoStar su~gests that the rural 
subscribers don't have to worrr. because there IS competition in the 
urban areas, and EchoStar Will give others who are in areas not 
served by cable the same deal that they give to people served by 
cable, so they will ~et the benefits of something like competition. 
It is interesting, It is novel, but I just don't think it hangs to-
gether for four reasons. First, it puts the government in the posi-
tion of doing something that the government hates to do, and that 
is review, monitor and check whether there is price discrimination 
from community to community to community throughout the 
United States. 
Whenever I hear from the satellite companies, it is about special 
offers, free goods, 30 days free, et cetera. How do you reconcile all 
of that in every single city, many of which are quite different in 
terms of their income? 
Second, that takes care of the price problem. I have less than a 
minute, Mr. Chairman. 
But what about all of the other forms of competition-service, 
quality, reliability, technology? In an area like this, you want com-
panies vigorously competing on the technological front. 
Third, it is still a three to two merged at best in the urban areas. 
I would regard it as cold comfort if I were somebody who couldn't 
get cable and was told, I will get the benefit of competition in other 
parts of the country when competition has been reduced from three 
firms to two. -
Finally, lastly, this proposed merger raises a very fundamental 
question about what antitrust is all about. We have bet this coun-
try for over 100 years on a system of free market protected by anti-
trust in which independent rivals compete fiercely, as the satellite 
companies have done to advance consumer welfare, to improve 
their product, to lower their prices. -
This is a proposal that we should trust well-intentioned people; 
they promise that they won't overdo it, they won't abuse the mar-
ket power that this merger allows. We haven't accepted that kind 
. of argument in this country. 
Now, maybe there is another deal that can he worked out here. 
Maybe DirecTV is leaving the market no matter what happens. But 
I .have to say that this deal, as proposed, has very serious prob-
lems. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ' 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pitofsky follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RoBERT PrroFSKY 
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am J)leased to appear before you 
today to present testimony concerning application of the antitrust laws to the pro-
posed,merger between EclioStar Corporation and G. M. Hughes ElectroniCS, the par-
ent company of DirecTV. I believe this merger raises profound issues for antitrust 
policy in both the telecommunications and media in®stries. 
Let me disclose at the outset that I am now Counsel to the Washirurton law firm 
of Arnold & Porter, and the firm represents Pegasus, a distributor ofl>BS services 
.~_~_o ___ ~·-~ ___ ' ______ _ 
"¥d.i' 
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and therefore a company with a deep interest in the economic consequences of thilJ 
. merger. 
EchoStar and DirecTV are today the only facilities ~ providers of direct 
broadcast satellite {DBS} services in the United States. Between them they control 
all three of the orbital slota lice~ by the Federal Communications Commission 
for DBS service capable of serving the entire U.S. It seems to be a common under-
stan~ that no additional satellites are likely to be available for DBS service in 
the foreSeeable future. Put another way, the barriers to entry into DDS service are 
virtually insurmountable. That was the reason that the Department of Justice, 
when it ieeued a complaint in 1998 seekirul to block the acquisition by Primestar 
of an orbital slot then held by Mel and NewsCorp, alleged there was no feasible 
means of entry into the multi-channel video buamesa in the near future.! That 
statement is no lees true today than it was in 1998. 
The testimony before the Committee today has revealed that there are many 
issues of fact relating to this transaction. For exaDl'p1e, there are claims that the 
proposed merger offers an OPJlOrtunity for lJubstanti81 efficiencies, and those effi-
ciencies are likely to be paeae(l on to consumers in the form of improved services. 
I am prepared to assume for the sake of this 8888ion that the people advoca~ the 
legality of this merger are well intentioned and credible and that their effiCIency 
claims-while they Will have to be carefully analyzed and confirmed-can be as-
sumed for now to be true. Even on that baSia, I offer my own conclusion that this 
transaction as presented faces serious-perhaps the more accurate description is in-
surmountable-antitrust problems. 
It fa helpful in t~ about the coDlpetitive and consumer effects of this pro-
posed merger to consider Ita impact in different parte of the country. Today in many 
sections of the countly-moet1,y rural but accounting for millions of subscriber&-
there is no cable television available.2 In other sections where cable is present, there 
are antiquated facilities that are unlikely to be upgraded in the foreseeable future 
BO that cable is a limited competitor. In those areas, however, consumers do have 
the benefit of two DBS providers-DirecTV and EchoStar-which compete aggres-
sively for consumer subscriptions through diacounta, free equipment, improved serv-
ice, and similar inducements. For subscribers located in those non-cable or limited-
cable areas, thisjropoa_ed deal is clearly a me~r to monopoly, with the predictable 
higher prices an indifferent quality that e~nence demonstrates will follow in the 
wake of that level of market J?Ower. In ruial areas, this merger does not "lessen 
competition," it completely eliminates it. 
On October 30, a Wall Street Jo~rnal editorial took an unusual view of the plight 
of viewers in non-cable areas. It observed that "those who choose to live in a corn-
field have rio claim on the rest of the economy just to subsidize their entertainment 
options" and therefore presumably can be left to the mercy of a mono}'Olist.3 Fortu-
nately, the antitrust laws ~revent mergers that lessen competition "10 ~ section 
of the country. It. even sections BOme in the preas think are too unsophisticated to 
matter. 
Those who would like to see the merger go through unchallenged are likely to 
argue that it is worthwhile giving up some competition in some parte of the country 
because the combined DBS outlets will be in a better position to compete with cable 
in other sections of the country. They argue that only DDS is in a position to chal-
lenge the high rates and less-than-perfect service offered by the huge cable compa-
nies. ODe problem with that argument is that in almost all sections of the country, 
there is only one cable supplier and unhappy subscribers now have two alternative 
and competing DBS sources to consider. After the merger there will be only one 
DBS source. As a result, even if one concedes that DDS and cable are direct com-
I Complaint at "84, 103, United State8 v. PriTMBtar, Inc. et al., (D.D.C. filed May 12, 1998). 
~For example, a recent New York Times article estimated that 40-.W% of homes in the fol-
lowing St.ltes are without cable acx:esa: Montana South Dakota Utah, Mississippi, Arkanaas 
and Vermont. In other states, including Idah0LWyoming, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Louiaiana, 
Missouri, Idaho, Alabama, Tennessee,1Centuc&y, Virginia, North Carolina, Maine and WlI-
COI1lin, an estimated 3()..40% of homes are without cable acx:esa. See Look, Up in the Sky! Big 
Bets on a Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES~ Oct. 30, 2001, at Cl. 
'EchoSl4r Power, WALL ST. oJ., Oct. 30, 2001, at A22. 
4 The key IIroviaion 0( &etion 7 of the Clayton Act reads as follows:No person en~ in com-
merce or in Any activity affecting. commerce shall acquire, dlrectly or indirectly, too whole or 
8Jl)' part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Fed-
eri! Trade CommillSion shall acquire th., whole or any part of the assets of another person en-
gaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce 
or 10 any activity affecting commerce in any section- of the country, the effect of such acquiaiUon 
may be substantially to leasen competition, or to tend .t:o create a monopoly. III U.S.C. § 18 (em-
pbuia added). 
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petiton-a point that EchoStar challenged a little more than a year ago in a private 
antitrust lawsuit 5-the merger would still result in a reduction of competitors from 
three to two with no prospect of new entry to alleviate that condition in the foresee-
able future. 
Let's assume, contrary to the forcefully stated views held by EchoStar just last 
year, that DBS and cable are in the same markets. There is a long history of the 
second and third firms in a three-firm market, with high barriers to entry, arguing 
that the combination will be better equipped to challenge the powerful number one. 
That argument was advanced br. Heinz and Beechnut a year ago when their merger, 
allegedly to put them i'.l a POSItion to compete more effectively with the dominant 
Gerber, wu challenged by the FTC. A unanimous District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals enjoined the merger in language that applies almost perfectly to the proposed 
&hoStar-DirecTV deal: 
"{There have been] no significant entries in the baby food market in dec-
ades and ... [new entry is) difficult and improbable ... As far as we can 
determine, no wurt has ever approved a merger to duopoly under similar 
circumstances." 6 
In advocating a fundamental change in merger policy. defenders of the merger 
have advanced several arguments. I noted earlier the argument that even conceding 
a lessening of competition to consumers in rural America, that reduction is worth-
while in order to improve competition in the remaining parts of the country. That 
kind of tradeoff'often is suggested by those-sponsoring a mClrger. In one of the first 
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court after section 7 of the Clayton Act was amend-
ed and updated in 1950, two Philadelt'hia banks tried to justify a merger that would 
produce a bUlh level of concentration In the local market on grounds that consumers 
In Philadelpliia might be harmed, but the merger would allow the larger bank re-
sulting from the merger to compete for very large loans with still larger out-of-state 
banks, particularly those located in New York. In language that the Court has ad-
hered to consiBtentlr ever since. it rejected what it called a concept of 
"counterveiling power. 
"If anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by procom-
petitive consequences in another, the logical upshot would be that every 
firm in an industry could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of merg-
ers that would make it in the end as large as the industry leader." 7 
Supporters of the merger also appear to argue that it will allow the combined 
firms to offer efficiencies to consumers, and with those efficiencies improved service. 
It will require fairly extensive investigation to determine the magnitude of any 
claimed efficiencies and also to address the question of whether those efficiencies 
could be achieved through means other than a merger between two direct competi-
tors. 
As noted earlier, I am willing to assume for p\}l'pOses of this discussion that sig-
nificant efficiencies may result. Nevertheless, under the Department of Justice-FTC 
revised Merger Guidelines, issued in 1997, and indicating for the first time a will-
ingness on the part of federal enforcemeJ;lt officials to take efficiencies into accountl 
any such efficiencies would not be adequate to justify what is an otherwise illegal 
merger that leads to monO}>oly or near monopoly. After explaining that mergers that 
produce high concentration can only be justified by exceptionally substantial effi-
ciencies. and tbat there must be the likelihood that those efficiencies would benefit 
consumers and have little potential adverse competitive effects. the Guidelines note: 
"In the Agency's experience, efficiencies are most likelr to make a difference 
in merger analysis when the likely adverse competitIve effects, absent the 
1\ Among the many points cited by EchoStar in arguing that DBS is a separate product market 
from cable are the following: s) A siJmificant number of DBS subscribers view DirecTV and 
EchoStar sa significantly closer substitutes than alternative sources of programming, including 
, cable television; b) It not constrained by EchoStar. DirecTV could raiseits~prices above the com-
petitive level without experiencing a significant constraint by cable; c) DBS and/or High Power 
DBS is superior f() moat cable services in several reapects, including a higher quality picture, 
aubatantiaIly more programming options, and pay-per-view in a "near-on-dimand~ environment 
that consumers find more attractive than the PSI-per-view environment offered by cable. See 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Request for Rule 56 Continuanoe f() Respond to DirecTV 
DeCendanu' Motion for Swnmary Judgment at 11-12, EchoStar CommunicatioM Corp. II. 
Dirtc'IV EnU,.,., Inc., No. OO-K-212 (D. COlo. rued Nov. 6, 20(0). 
tJFedirol 'I'rtuk Commiuion (I. HJ. 'Hew Co., 246 F.8d 708, 717 (D.C. CU. 20(1). 
7U1IiI«l Statu II. Phil4delphi4 Natioool BaM, 374 U.S. 321,370 (1963). 
~-------.-----,--
it, 
"~, 
36 
efficiencies, are not great. Etffcietwie, alnwn never jrutify Q merger. to mo-
Mpoly or neor-moMjJoly." atalies added.}8 
Let me elaborate briefly on the point. The reason the DOJIFTC Merger Guidelines 
were amended to permit efficiency claime is that efficiencies generated by merger 
may enhance the merged firms al:iility and incentive to compete, and may result in 
lower prices, improved quality, enhaDced services or new product.. But the whole 
idea il that those efficiencies would then be likely to be Jiused on to conaumera. 
H the me~r leada to monopoly or a near monopoly. there II no reason for the firma 
not to deCIde to pocket the gains that result from no lo~r compet41g with each 
other. Thus, evell under a liberal interpretation of the role of effiCIencies in merger 
enforcement, they would not be sufficient to save the kind of illegal transaction pro-
~jJ, EchoStar and DirecTV. 
. J!Y, advocates of the proposed merger have advanced a most unusual argu-
ment. They suggest that fOI: most of the country the combined DBS coml'8DY Will 
have to com~te with cable, and competition with cable will keep the DBS rates 
competitive. They also have jlromised not to discriminate between rates and terms 
oft"eied in cable and non-cable areas, 10 that lubscribers in rural areas, faced with 
a monopoly, would not have to pay monopoly rates. 
There are several problems with that argument. First, it leaves the government 
in the position of monitoring rates and complicated terms in every community to 
guard against discrimination-a role that the government tries not to play in a free 
market economy-certainly not when the transaction is a horizontal merger to mo-
nopoly or near monopoly. Second, even if the price terms are worked out, that saya 
nothing about the loss of competition in non-price dimensions-including customer 
service, tlrogra.rnn$lg packages, advanced services and, in particular, technological 
competition. In a high-tech, dynamic, rapidly developing field like video progranJ-
ming delivel1., competition in terms of quality and technology is particular1r impor-
tant. Third, if the merger reduces competition in urban markets, and redUCIng com-
petitors from three to two certainly suggests such a threat, there is little comfort 
m pegging prices in rura1 areas to what may be less-than-competitive lrices in 
urban areaa. Moat important, the suggestion that me~ers to monopoly an duopoly 
should escape challenge if the merged companies promise not to abuse their market 
power is fundamentally inconsistent with U.S. antitrust enforcement. We depend on 
vigorous competition amon~ rivals to produce reasonably priced and high quality 
product.. The idea of aubitituting for competition the promises of the moat sincere 
captains of industry is aimply not the philosophy that we have pursued conaistently 
in this country. -
The pro~ed merger also raises troubling issues in the emerging broadband mar-
ket-that IS the provision of upgraded high-speed access to the Internet. In a series 
of proceedings-mcluding those occasioned by the AOllI'ime Warner merger9 and 
the AT&TlMedia One merger 10, the Antitrust Division, the FTC and the FCC have 
all sought to preserve competition in this extremely important new market. Con-
gress nas also been concerned that megamergers not lead to a situation in which 
high-speed access to the Internet will come under the control of one or a small hand-
ful of companies. This merger would threaten a potential monopoly in satellite 
broadband service. 
Wired broadband technologies, such as cable and telephone connections ("DSL ") 
have been slow to emerge in rura1 areas for many of the same reasons that these 
areas have limited cable_penetration. There is not sufficient demand to inaure more 
rapid devel0tlment. Satellite broadband service provides the most viable technolog)' 
that can bndJle the digital divide in rural America. /u noted, the merger of 
EchoStar and 1>irecTV would be a merger to monopoly for millions of rura1 con-
aumers who, both today and tomorrow, have no alternative to DBS for broadband 
Internet as well as multi-channel video service. 
Here, too, the me~ parties argue that the merger, by increasing caP4city and 
eliminating "duplication," will enable them. to devote more capacity to rollliig out 
• U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission REVISIONS TO HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES U (1991), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)' 13j.l04 (1997). 
88ft AlMrioon Online, Inc., and Time Wa1'Mr. Inc.: Analysie to Aid Public Ulmment. 65 Fed. 
~. 79861 (FTC Dee. ~ 2,(00); In tM Malter of ApplicotioM for Consent to 1M TroMfu of 
Coiatrol of Li«Mu and lHCficll 214 AuthorizatioM fJi Time Wanwr Inc. and.Amerioo OnUM, 
1rtC.~ TroMforon. to AOL '/'i.me Wanwr Inc., Tramftrw, 23 Comm. Reg. 157 (FCC Jan. 22.£.2001). 
luProDOied Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement: UniUd Statu II. AT&-l' q"p. 
and MeilUJOM G1"OlJP. rlUJ:l65!ed. ~. S8584 (DOJ June 21, 2000); In 1M MatUr of Appliia-
tionI for CoIIMnt to 1M J."T'rZMTU ~ COntrol of LictIUU and Section 214 AuthoriaztioM from 
MtdJtjOM Group, 1rtC., 'I"roMftror to AT&T Corp. 1'roM{tIW, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816 (FCC June 6, 
2000). . 
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broadband services. But the "duplication" they seek to eliminate is competition 
it8elf.· Mereover~ they would have to bear the tiurden of showing why the increase 
. in capacity thia ,m~r_ would produce is necessary to bring out the services that 
both DireCTV and EchoStar have prom.iJled consumers for some time that each aepa-
rat,ely wouJdprovide.ll 
The aim of antitrust merger enforcement is to protect consumers from the abuaes 
that follow from extreme concentration of market ~wer. As Proposedi the EchoStar-
DireeTV merger certainly raiaea that threat, and consumers are eft with CEO 
. promiaea (and perhaps hard to enforce conduct remedies) to protect against abuses. 
It may be that DfrecTV is detenirined to exit the market-a& it has every right 
to do. But without a facilitie.based structural remedy that insures that consumers 
have roughly the same options they have now, this merger should not be permitted. 
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Robert Phillips, president and CEO 
of the National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative. 
TESTIMONY OF BOB PHILLh '8, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 
NATIONAL RURAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COOPERATIVE 
Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning, 
Ranking Representative Conyers and other Members of the Com-
mittee. It is a .privilege to appear before you today to represent the 
views of the National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative, or 
NRTC, regarding the proposed merger of EchoStar and DirecTV, 
and its impacts on the multichannel video distribution market. 
NRTC believes that this merger, as proposed1 is bad for competi-tion in rural America because it creates a rurru monopoly, it elimi-
nates choice, and it eliminates competition. 
From our founding in 1986 it has been NRTC's focus to bring ad-
vanced rural telecommurucations services to all of those who live 
and work in rural America. NRTC has also been involved in the 
satellite television business, starting with large dish satellite serv-
ice or C-band, including our own investment of our members and 
utilities in excess of $100 million to help launch the DirecTV serv-
ice. 
Today, NRTC, through its participating members, who are rural 
electric cooperatives and ruritl telephone cooperatives and compa-
nies as well as affiliates like Pe~asus satellite, serve more than 1.B 
million rural subscribers with DlrecTV. 
As I said, this merger does eliminate competition for rural con-
sumers. Literally millions of rural homes have no access to cable 
television or digital cable television services. That makes satellite 
their only option for video programming. > 
And I did bring a map today which is a blow-up of the chart 
which I included in my testimony, showing on a state-by-state 
basis how tens of millions of people have no choice for video pro-
gramming other than satellite. 
Today, these consumers can choose between EchoStar's dish serv-
ice or DirecTV. If this merger is approved, their choices go from 
those two providers to one. The proponents of this two to one merg-
er argue that promises will suffice for competition and that tlie 
11 For example, an expert retained by the DOJ in a recent case regarding the constitutionality 
of mult<alTY 'provill!ons in the Satellite. Home Viewer Improvement Act opined that both 
EchoBtar ana DirecTV could I18e currently available teehnology to signifieantll~' creue their 
ability to Jlrovide local programming to additional markets. See Declaration of er J. R~h, 
SaklliU Bl"CJCIdctuti"ll .I: Communication. Au'n v. FCC u aI., No. 00-1571·A <E .. Va. dateG 
May 23,- 20(1). If ttie DOor. expert fa correct, one of the princi~l efficienclelS advanced by 
EelioStar and DirecTV in support of their merger could be achieved by either company alone. 
Eftkiencles aehievable by lell anticompetitive meana do not justify iI merger to monopoly or 
near monopoly. 
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